Brownstreak Check In

[Flying Razorback]

Check in when you get a chance bud.  I hope you and your friends are all safe this morning.  Terrible tragedy.

[gotyacovered]

It sure is...

Saw this around 5:30-6 this morn and brownstreak was my first thought.

[Brownstreak]

Thanks guys.  I'm home and ok. I leave tonight for a 2 week Asia trip.  I'm trying to spend as much time with the family as possible.  I knew the FO, but didn't know the Captain.  Unfortunately they didn't make it.  That's only our 2nd fatal accident since the airline started in 1987. 

Thanks again for checking on me. 

[Flying Razorback]

Awesome, glad you're safe.  I know there are a lot of pilots in your company, but you always got to check.  Have a safe trip.  It's one of the saddest realities of aviation, the longer you do it, the more people you know that have this happen.  You guys have a great safety record, fly great aircraft, and hire the best.  There's a reason these things are rare for you. 

Here's to those you lost today.

[gotyacovered]

Here's to those you lost today.

+1

[GusMcRae]

Here's to those you lost today.

Here. 

[gotyacovered]

2nd NTSB video

http://t.co/IEth1Hb8Yh

[gotyacovered]

"@NTSB: Engines showed no sign of an uncontained failure or pre impact fire. #UPS 1354"

[gotyacovered]

"@NTSB: Investigators have obtained radar data and is in the process of reviewing information. #UPS 1354"

[Brownstreak]

Here's an article about the FO

http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/08/ups_plane_crash_pilot.html

I haven't seen one yet on the Captain, but I know that he was an ex-marine aviator and was well liked and respected.  He left a wife and 2 daughters, one of which was starting college on a basketball scholarship. 

I'll wait to see what the NTSB says about it and discount anything the FAA puts out.

Thank you all for your kind words!

[gotyacovered]

Here's an article about the FO

http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/08/ups_plane_crash_pilot.html

I haven't seen one yet on the Captain, but I know that he was an ex-marine aviator and was well liked and respected.  He left a wife and 2 daughters, one of which was starting college on a basketball scholarship. 

I'll wait to see what the NTSB says about it and discount anything the FAA puts out.

Thank you all for your kind words!

that would be great.... the NTSB is really irritating in cases like this... why do they feel it necessary to hold press conferences when they have nothing to say.

[gotyacovered]

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/17/us-usa-crash-ups-idUSBRE97G0BE20130817

"The autopilot was engaged until the last second of recorded data," said Robert Sumwalt, a senior official with the National Transportation Safety Board.

[Brownstreak]

Here are a few NASA reports for BHM that people have posted on our pilot board.


#1

The approach to runway 18 at bhm is marginally safe at best and is a setup for an accident at worst. Runway 5/23 was closed from XA00Z to XK00Z. As a result, we briefed the localizer runway 18 approach. It was my first officer's leg and neither of us had flown to this runway before. We were both acutely aware of the high terrain to the north of the field and paid particular attention to that fact in our approach briefing. The only depiction of the high terrain is on the airport page. The WX was clear with excellent visibility. Bhm approach cleared us for the visual but we indicated we wanted to intercept the final outside of baskin and fly the final part of the localizer 18 approach. Although not listed on the approach page, there is a PAPI on the left side of runway 18 which has been in use for about 1 yr. We calculated the appropriate vdp based on timing as well as on the ibxo DME. From the vdp it was clear to us that if the field was not in sight at the 1300 ft altitude at the ibxo 3.3 DME, it would not be possible to complete the approach safely. The PAPI was visible from the 3.3 DME and we began a 700 FPM descent when on GS. The first officer and I were both bothered by the close visual proximity of the ground while on the final stages of the approach. At about 1 mi from touchdown, a car passed under us on an east/west road. It was between 100 ft and 80 ftAGL. I again verified visually that we were on the PAPI glide path and that the glide path was visually correct with the runway visual presentation. It was clear that we were correct and the radio altimeter then began to show the ground dropping away a bit. We passed over the threshold at 50 ft AGL having been centered on the glide path the entire time. By use of the ft scale and the graphic presentation on the airport page, I believe the radio altimeter was accurate and that we were on or even slightly above the glide path when we had the 80-100 ft reading. How high are the trees on that hill? Although the approach and landing were uneventful, the following problems are presented: 1) there is no note about the extremely close proximity to high terrain when on this approach. The mandatory airport review page does not address runway 18 or runway 36. 2) there is no PAPI depicted in commercial chart despite having been in service for about 1 yr according to the bhm tower. 3) using a 3 degree GS and an aim point 1000 ft down runway 18, the 884 ft terrain 4000 ft north of the field calculates to a ht above ground of less than 100 ft. Trees are of course not included in this calculation. 4) runway 18 slopes down to the south and complicates the landing. A 7100 ft runway means a 6100 ft area to stop in and the downslope tends to have the effect of falling away from an aircraft in the flare. Unless you fly it on to the runway fairly aggressively, the distance could be even less. 5) NOTAM 11/023 reports runway 18 is ungrooved from 1550 to 2490. NOTAM 11/024 reports runway 36 is ungrooved from 4610-5550 ft. This obviously would have an affect on stopping under most instrument conditions, ie, a wet runway. I respectfully submit the following recommendation: discontinue use of runway 18 for company operations due to the high terrain present under the normal glide path. This is a dangerous approach so prohibit it. If the use of runway 18 is not prohibited, then I make the following recommendations: 1) include a picture of the runway 18 and runway 36 approachs on the mandatory airport review pages. 2) include specific notes on the operations pages about the high terrain to the north giving radio altimeter readings of 80-100 ft, 1 mi north of the field. 3) restrict use of runway 18 to day VFR conditions only and require the localizer runway 18 approach be flown. 4) update the bhm page forthwith to show the PAPI for runway 18. To be blunt, I will not fly to this runway in the WX or to a wet runway. If it is the only runway open in those conditions I will divert. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter states that he has followed up with company, and they have issued a prohibition against using runways 18/36 except during day VFR conditions. He also stated that he did not see the rotating beacon on the hill approximately 1 mi from the runway. The GPWS indication did not show any red during the approach, but varied from green to amber. The first officer was flying the approach and the captain monitored the descent. He said that they did not exceed about 700 FPM rate throughout the final approach, and that after landing, both pilots debriefed their impressions to each other. They felt that they had taken prudent precautions, but that this approach was hazardous.

[Brownstreak]

2 more:

- On short final to Runway 18, we received a GPWS "Too Low Terrain" Alert. The pilot flying initiated a go-around. Aircraft was on glide slope and airspeed. The visual was backed up by the RNAV glide slope. The PAPI was showing two red over two white.
[This] could be an anomaly with the GPWS. There was a NOTAM on the RNAV for Runway 36 approach, noting terrain warnings and that the approach was no longer authorized.

Rway 36 - On the visual approach to Runway 36 at BHM, as we passed over a ridge (radar altimeter had just called 500 feet over what appeared to be the highest point) approximately 3 miles from the airport, the GPWS alert "Terrain, Terrain" followed by "Whoop, Whoop, Pull Up" briefly sounded. As we had acquired the airport 15 miles out and at this point had a clear straight line view to the touch down zone of Runway 36, we were a bit confused. Before I (as the flying pilot) could initiate an escape maneuver, the alarm stopped (only lasted 2 seconds). I leveled off briefly and, in the absence of further GPWS callouts, continued the visual descent to Runway 36. As we were on a visual approach, we had loaded the visual approach into the GPS. Additionally, we had enabled the snowflake. Although aware that the snowflake does not provide terrain separation, we typically attempt to follow the snowflake so as to descend at an appropriate descent rate. As we approached Runway 36, I had been maneuvering the aircraft to keep the flight path well clear of the ridge. As a backup, I also attempted to keep the snowflake centered. Apparently, this is one of those situations where following the snowflake will cause the aircraft to penetrate the GPWS terrain parameters for this runway.

[Brownstreak]

An observation by one of our senior A300 captains:

I did in the Bus several times. I was not impressed regarding the ground clearance. Felt if on the PAPI our mains would be fanning leaves about 3/4 mile final. We did get a 100' callout about 1/2 mile final. Fortunately, that first approach was dawn with decent light. Told my F/O I would never accept an approach to that runway in the dark or weather and never did. Also advised him to remember that if flying with another Captain. Cannot remember if the approach plate had a night restriction at that time.

[gotyacovered]

so... in short--this approach sucks. it was not the captains first time shooting this approach... he gets terrain warning, which was basically normal on this approach, and doesn't realize that he is actually was in danger of colliding with terrain THIS time   

am i understanding that correctly? (as a possible scenario)

[GusMcRae]

BHM is where we flew into commercial from DAL in route to MDQ (drove through Huntsville and on up North to MDQ) to go do a pre-buy and subsequently fly my 182 back home, early Dec of 2011. 

Sounds to me like they need to at least top some trees.  Curious if the clearance footage is ever revised over time due to tree growth.  In that part of the world, could be significant. 
This also might be a candidate for just dealing with a crosswind landing in IFR conditions or at night, if they would allow it. 
Eye opening stuff surfacing here. 
Any other accident history in the archives due to planes colliding with terrain on approach to 18?

[Brownstreak]

so... in short--this approach sucks. it was not the captains first time shooting this approach... he gets terrain warning, which was basically normal on this approach, and doesn't realize that he is actually was in danger of colliding with terrain THIS time   

am i understanding that correctly? (as a possible scenario)

I think you've got it.  It's normal to get a sink rate or some kind of strange RA call outs, so they get ignored.  I've never flown the A300, but some guys are saying when it's in VNAV path, it waits too long to intercept the path then pushes over to catch it.  That might explain the sink rate?  Also, they had the AP on until the very end, so the question becomes what vertical mode were they using?  VNAV or vertical speed?  Add to this a black hole approach with terrain issues plus day 2 of back side of the clock flying.  I will be shocked if fatigue isn't also a player.

[Brownstreak]

Gus,

I absolutely agree with your tree height questions also.

[RNC]

What's the terrain warning threshold on the gear you guys fly?

I can get mine to go off at 500 feet, it seems.

[Flying Razorback]

Here's an article with discussion about the fatigue of the pilots and their discussion of it before the crash and the debate about air carriers not following new FAA rules.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-20/ups-crash-pilot-told-colleague-schedule-was-killing-him.html

Also the accident report and CVR transcripts are here.

http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=55307&CurrentPage=1&EndRow=15&StartRow=1&order=1&sort=0&TXTSEARCHT=

I read every cockpit voice recorder transcript of every accident report I find.  It never gets easier.  Every one makes my heart tighten and my stomach flip.  However, I feel it's important for me to internalize the great responsibility of this job/hobby and how unforgiving it can be.  You can go from chatting having a normal cockpit conversation to "CVR Records Rustling/Impact Sounds" in a matter of seconds.

There were mistakes made here.  But I try to remain non-judging unless their acts were pure careless or criminal.  They were normal mistakes made at the end of a long day with a non-standard approach.

God speed.

[Flying Razorback]

If you want to avoid the end of this transcript I'd understand, but here's the full transcript from loading at Louisville.  While on the ground there they had a conversation about how tired they were and how the fatigue rules weren't being applied to Cargo.  It's on page 12-15 to 12-17.

http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F55000%2D55499%2F55307%2F550788%2Epdf

[Brownstreak]

I spent all day watching the NTSB hearing live.  Some of the statements made by UPS were hilarious. They were asked why they took out the remarks section in our weather package and their response was that it was a "cost issue and besides, there isn't much weather at night".  Yep, he really said there isn't much weather at night.  There were quite a few other doozies in there. 

[Flying Razorback]

I don't work with any UPS drivers but I have worked with people who fly for another large commercial cargo transport.  So I don't have personal insight so don't take this as an insult if I'm way off base.  But I have heard the old mantra "UPS is a trucking company that happens to own some airplanes..."

Do you believe there is a cultural attitude of that reflected from 'big UPS'?  Obviously the consequences in trucking/shipping can be major, but everyone here knows how aviation is unforgiving and the consequences are always extremely high. 

I read through a lot of that CVR transcript and it really flipped my stomach bad.  They always do, but I had never read a full transcript that started on the ground at their origin where you get to hear their candid conversation.

[Brownstreak]

I don't work with any UPS drivers but I have worked with people who fly for another large commercial cargo transport.  So I don't have personal insight so don't take this as an insult if I'm way off base.  But I have heard the old mantra "UPS is a trucking company that happens to own some airplanes..."

Do you believe there is a cultural attitude of that reflected from 'big UPS'?  Obviously the consequences in trucking/shipping can be major, but everyone here knows how aviation is unforgiving and the consequences are always extremely high. 

I read through a lot of that CVR transcript and it really flipped my stomach bad.  They always do, but I had never read a full transcript that started on the ground at their origin where you get to hear their candid conversation.

Yes, it's absolutely the culture.  It's a trucking company run by bean counters which makes it doubly hard on us aviator types.

[Flying Razorback]

Yes, it's absolutely the culture.  It's a trucking company run by bean counters which makes it doubly hard on us aviator types.

Thanks for being honest.  I definitely had a gut-check on what my future plans might be after reading the transcript of their discussion while on the ground at Louisville.  Your remarks about the hearing testimony makes me angry, I don't know how people can be so aloof about aviation.

[Brownstreak]

I would write you a recommendation, but I'd give you an earful about what to expect when hired here.  The money and benefits are great and so are the crews, but that's about it.  Of course, if they're the first place to hire you, take the job and keep your options open. I would put OooPS close to the bottom of your list of major airlines to apply.