Seattlehog - 5150

[vector4dz]

5150 - What I Know - Week 11 - 2015

5150
California legal code for involuntary psychiatric commitment

Outcome Bias:
An error made in evaluating the quality of a decision when the outcome of that decision is already known

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Ellis slept through much of the first half.  She would wake up to holler for hot chocolate or cotton candy then doze back off.  I felt like this was an acceptable strategy.

My phone buzzed with texts in the first half.  Examples:

"WHAT!?"

"(insert profanity) TACKLE (insert profanity)!

"I HATE THIS TEAM!"

"Is Drew Morgan dislocating his shoulder on every catch?"


Ellis and I went for a walk mid 2nd quarter.  We were going to find her cousin Q who, it turns out, was seated at the farthest point possible from us.  We wandered through stairwells and encountered locked doors and doors with warnings.  We went up a long staircase and were almost trampled by students fleeing the scene when the Hogs went down 31-14.  Ellis kept saying "Daddy I don't think you know what you are doing."

It turns out this was true.  Q was seated in a "Club" section and we were turned away at the door like fat girls at a trendy club.  I tried to slip the dude a twenty and he said "What am I gonna do with that? Buy 2 hot dogs at the concession stand?"

Point taken.

We wandered back through the warren of hallways and ramps and stairs.  Ellis muttering unflattering things about her father. "You should have given him a thousand dollars" she said.

"I should have given him YOU." I said.

-----

There was a roar or two before we got back to our seats and it was 31-21.  "Are the Razorbacks gonna win Daddy?" she asked.

I answered her.

"That's a mean thing to say daddy.  And who is Robb Smith and why are you so mean about him?" Ellis responded.

Then everything turned.  Mississippi State started blowing it like ... well like Mississippi State. In the instant it takes for a ball to pop loose from a kick returner it was all different.

We had a great time in the third quarter.  Ellis did some dances and screamed even though she had no idea what was going on.  She said things like "Mississippis are pretty bad daddy."  I injured my shoulder throwing her in the air. 

My phone again blew up with texts.  Examples:

"I LOVE THIS TEAM!"

"One stop and we have this"

"I KNEW they would crumble"

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It is at this point we get into "decision making" and  the fact that outcome determines how we view those decisions.  So let's take a step back and just look at the decisions themselves in proper context.

4TH DOWN BOMB IN 3RD QUARTER:  Going for it was unquestionably the right decision. (Based on the fact that we have absolutely no confidence in our field goal kicker - hold that thought please) This should have been clear on THIRD down and the play sequence should have reflected that.  I don't think it did but that is probably outcome bias.  If you have 2 downs and you are completing 60% of your passes the math looks good.  If you are averaging maybe a yard per carry then less so.  Either way it seems like either 2 runs or 2 passes are the percentage plays.  I suspect Hunter deep was the second option on the pass.  It seemed like BA looked in the flat first.  The deep play should either have been the primary design of the play or there should have been multiple first down options.  Basically I think this was a bit mishandled but the play callers nailed about every other play so I will give the benefit of the doubt.

GOING FOR TWO: This was meaningless (because it succeeded) but it was utter foolishness.  We gain nothing by getting it (up 6 instead of 5) but if we miss it we are only up 4 and will be down 3 when MSU scores it's inevitable touchdown and thus our field goal will only be for a tie.  Interestingly - if we had FAILED it would have been better.  We wouldn't have played for a field goal and a tie - we would have played for a touchdown and a win.

END GAME RED ZONE: A couple things to remember.  MSU had 3 timeouts.  So if we throw the ball we let them save either time or timeouts.  Each pass (if it failed) saves a timeout.  Either way they would have 50 seconds or so when we were done.  So all decisions should have been made with that knowledge.  How much time and how many timeouts will MSU need to score a) a field goal or b) a touchdown.

   So I think it's safe to say based on Auburn experience and the entirety of this game that 50 seconds and no timeouts was just enough for a field goal but probably not a TD.  50 seconds and 3 timeouts means they will maybe get some end zone shots.

   The next ( and most important) consideration is the confidence in making a 30 yard field goal.  We said earlier that from about 47 yards we had little to no confidence.  What's the percentage confidence from 30 yards under intense pressure.  Kindly I would say 80% but it may be lower.  Regardless of the number there was a VERY VERY REAL chance the FG would be unsuccessful.

   It is this last point that should have determined the play calling.  A TD would be nice given score and time.  But the fact that the FG had at least a 1 in 5 chance of failing was a much bigger risk than trying one or two end zone (or even first down) throws.


To sum all this up - I'm ok with the 4th down play because it was at least aggressive.  But if you are going to be aggressive once you have to be aggressive again.  Playing for a field goal was a mistake even if we would have made it.

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On to WHAT I KNOW - WEEK 11

I know us Hog fans look MUCH more attractive in cold weather gear than we do sweating in our shorts at the hot weather games.

I know when Ellis was supposed to be going to sleep last night she said "Daddy can I stay up and watch a show?  I feel too SAD about the Razorbacks to go to sleep."

I know when I am being manipulated.

I know she got to stay up and watch a show anyway.

I know I just spent about 1000 words dissecting offensive decision making but those decisions aren't what we should be talking about.

I know Robb Smith isn't dumb or ignorant and that he knows more about football than any of us.

I know Robb Smith has very real personnel issues.

I know that even with those caveats Robb Smith needs to scrap every single thing he has thought up to this point on how to play against spread offenses.

I know his scheme may be well thought out but spread teams are scoring TDs on around 80% of possessions (just made that number up) when we don't get a turnover.

I know whatever he is doing is WRONG and it can't be tweaked or adjusted.  He needs to start completely over.

I know it's virtually impossible to stop Dak Prescott on 3rd and 1.  Just like it was with Tim Tebow and Cam Newton.

I know if you have that kind of advantage it makes things very nice.

I know there are a million other things to say about this game - many many good and many many bad.  But I know I have tired of it already.

I know we are at the stage of Ellis's life where she LOVES to listen to really bad and fun pop songs.  We sing along and dance around the house.

I know that this is my favorite stage so far.

(Pics on the blog)

(Look for a post late tonight on the early season hoop hogs)

Until Next Time

Seattle

Twitter: @seattlehog
http://seattlehog.org/

[BDSCT51]

Nice read and thanks!

[Hawgey-Davidson]

Good post bro.

[PonderinHog]

5150 - Pretty much sums up our season.  Crazy...   :razorback:

[Wayne Watson]

Good read!  Thanks!

[cypert2]

Agree with your assessment of our end of game strategy for the same reasons you gave and have posted so elsewhere. You will not find much agreement here. Most posters fell that since "every other coach in America" would of played it like BB did that it must be correct. That can't realize that 'every other coach in America " was not coaching THIS Arkansas team.  ( btw I think your 80% prob of making the fg was high )

[SemperFi]

Great read! Always look forward to reading your stuff.

[vector4dz]

Agree with your assessment of our end of game strategy for the same reasons you gave and have posted so elsewhere. You will not find much agreement here. Most posters fell that since "every other coach in America" would of played it like BB did that it must be correct. That can't realize that 'every other coach in America " was not coaching THIS Arkansas team.  ( btw I think your 80% prob of making the fg was high )

Yeah I was being nice with the 80%.

Honestly - when looking at decision making and taking the passion out of it - I remain most mystified by the 2 point conversion decision. I'm assuming they have a chart that says to go for two because being up 6 gives you a tie instead of a loss with 2 field goals.  It was a total failure in understanding situational statistics.

[MuskogeeHogFan]

Agree with your assessment of our end of game strategy for the same reasons you gave and have posted so elsewhere. You will not find much agreement here. Most posters fell that since "every other coach in America" would of played it like BB did that it must be correct. That can't realize that 'every other coach in America " was not coaching THIS Arkansas team.  ( btw I think your 80% prob of making the fg was high )

You would be wrong. From that distance this year we have been 5 of 6 (83.3%). No need for anyone to attempt to be "kind" when it is a fact.

[vector4dz]

You would be wrong. From that distance this year we have been 5 of 6 (83.3%). No need for anyone to attempt to be "kind" when it is a fact.

Except  that you are using statistics incorrectly.  None of the previous six attempts were under end of game pressure.

For instance - in practice I would estimate he makes 95%+ from that distance. Which drops to 83% in game situations (on a too small sample size to predict anything). This would again drop in an end game situation So the percentage of 80% IS being kind - but probably not by a lot.

[MuskogeeHogFan]

Except  that you are using statistics incorrectly.  None of the previous six attempts were under end of game pressure.

For instance - in practice I would estimate he makes 95%+ from that distance. Which drops to 83% in game situations (on a too small sample size to predict anything). This would again drop in an end game situation So the percentage of 80% IS being kind - but probably not by a lot.

And you are attempting to twist and bend actual results to fit your scenario. If anything is inaccurate it is your projection and assumption based on opinion instead of facts.

[ShadowTheHedgehog]

I still think that going for two was the right call. It was a call made because CBB knew that we would not stop Dak on their next possession. We had to get into a position where when they scored we could win it with a FG even if they scored and went for two.

IMO that shows he had no faith in our D stopping Miss State and was planning for what would happen after they scored again on their next drive.

Even IF we had failed the 2-pt, there was a greater chance of us scoring another TD than us stopping Miss State.

Great read though +1

[red_beard_82]

Yeah I was being nice with the 80%.

Honestly - when looking at decision making and taking the passion out of it - I remain most mystified by the 2 point conversion decision. I'm assuming they have a chart that says to go for two because being up 6 gives you a tie instead of a loss with 2 field goals.  It was a total failure in understanding situational statistics.

The two point conversion was the only decision that could never be argued with. When going for two in situations where you lead, unless you're Kevin Kelly, you do so based on what advantage it gives you. A 4 point lead is exactly the same as a 5 point lead. Both require a touchdown and both lose to a touchdown. A 6 point lead is different than a 4 point lead. A touchdown only ties. It forces them to make the extra point. So going for 1 left you with effectively the same lead you already had. Going for two put you up 2 field goals or 1 touchdown. If you don't make it, no harm. If you do make it, a better lead.

[BPsTheMan]

+1 sir

[cypert2]

You would be wrong. From that distance this year we have been 5 of 6 (83.3%). No need for anyone to attempt to be "kind" when it is a fact.

You take a sample size of six, I believe all of which were taking in relatively un pressured situations, and say it is a "fact" that we had a 83.3% chance of hitting that field goal in a high pressure situation. If you were 83.3% sure that our field goal unit, which has been shaky at best the last two years, was going to hit that field goal you were quite the optimist. You were also wrong. What is a fact is that in two of our last three conference games our field goal unit had a chance to win the game in the last minute. It's a fact that both times they failed. BB coached the final drive about how a NFL coach would of coached it. Unfortunately, and what should of been obviously, our field goal unit is no where near NFL calibre.

[Dr. Starcs]

I had assumed we went for two to go up by 6 after seeing them just miss an extra point.

[vector4dz]

The two point conversion was the only decision that could never be argued with. When going for two in situations where you lead, unless you're Kevin Kelly, you do so based on what advantage it gives you. A 4 point lead is exactly the same as a 5 point lead. Both require a touchdown and both lose to a touchdown. A 6 point lead is different than a 4 point lead. A touchdown only ties. It forces them to make the extra point. So going for 1 left you with effectively the same lead you already had. Going for two put you up 2 field goals or 1 touchdown. If you don't make it, no harm. If you do make it, a better lead.

Everything you say is correct except the fact that it can't be argued. You are absolutely right as to the reasoning on their play card. But there is ABSOLUTE harm in being up only 4 as opposed to 5.  Particularly in a game with only about 2 possessions left.  2 field goals is unlikely to come into play (possible but unlikely). But the opponent scoring a touchdown was almost a given.

All the math is moot though if you have a play you have practiced that you are very confident in - which it appears they did.

[vector4dz]

And you are attempting to twist and bend actual results to fit your scenario. If anything is inaccurate it is your projection and assumption based on opinion instead of facts.

Again you don't understand statistics OR how they are used to project  things. The only "fact" is the 5 for 6 number. That ABSOLUTELYA DOES NOT mean that the likelihood he makes that kick is 83%. The actual likelihood or projection is based on that one fact PLUS all other factors including situation.

For instance - with your reasoning if he was kicking in a hurricane the projection would be 83%. The actual likelihood would be much lower. This is a FACT. And it isn't being twisted. (Maybe just a little)

[Biggus Piggus]

First of all, thanks again for posting on Hogville.

4TH DOWN BOMB IN 3RD QUARTER:  Going for it was unquestionably the right decision. (Based on the fact that we have absolutely no confidence in our field goal kicker - hold that thought please) This should have been clear on THIRD down and the play sequence should have reflected that.  I don't think it did but that is probably outcome bias.  If you have 2 downs and you are completing 60% of your passes the math looks good.  If you are averaging maybe a yard per carry then less so.  Either way it seems like either 2 runs or 2 passes are the percentage plays.  I suspect Hunter deep was the second option on the pass.  It seemed like BA looked in the flat first.  The deep play should either have been the primary design of the play or there should have been multiple first down options.  Basically I think this was a bit mishandled but the play callers nailed about every other play so I will give the benefit of the doubt.

In the fourth quarter, Mississippi State's DBs started wearing our receivers like a second jersey, with the strategy of "they can't call every penalty." That is why nobody was open on that fourth down play. Everybody was being mauled, and nobody was going to flag it. Anyway, the play should have been trying to gain a yard with multiple options for doing so. It resulted in a belated, low-percentage throw, with the QB not in any position to run for it. Dropback pass in that situation was the first mistake. Don't know what they were thinking.

GOING FOR TWO: This was meaningless (because it succeeded) but it was utter foolishness.  We gain nothing by getting it (up 6 instead of 5) but if we miss it we are only up 4 and will be down 3 when MSU scores it's inevitable touchdown and thus our field goal will only be for a tie.  Interestingly - if we had FAILED it would have been better.  We wouldn't have played for a field goal and a tie - we would have played for a touchdown and a win.

It actually was not utter foolishness; it was off the conventional when-you-go-for-2 list. Being ahead by 6 instead of 5 was meaningful; MSU, after all, did miss an extra point in the game. Getting more points instead of fewer is usually the right thing to do. Moreover, if Arkansas had kicked the extra point and made it, the score would have been 49-44. Then the Hogs would have trailed 50-49 after the inevitable MSU response TD + the Bulldogs would have had the decision about going for 2.

If Mullen knew anything about the Hogs' kicking game, he would have kicked the PAT. Then Arkansas surely would have played for the field goal. Karma.

The next ( and most important) consideration is the confidence in making a 30 yard field goal.  We said earlier that from about 47 yards we had little to no confidence.  What's the percentage confidence from 30 yards under intense pressure.  Kindly I would say 80% but it may be lower.  Regardless of the number there was a VERY VERY REAL chance the FG would be unsuccessful.

I was less concerned about Hedlund's potential to kick what turned out to be a 29-yard field goal attempt than the Hogs' ability to keep Mississippi State from blocking it. On that potential game-winner at Oxford, the protection fell apart. Someone came up the middle, for crying out loud. Through the line.

But I also went and looked at season stats. Besides the 45-yarder that Hedlund made at Ole Miss, he had not hit anything else longer than 27 yards. He had never had the chance to make a 30-ish yard field goal. Weird. Had missed tries from 37, 41 and 47. Makes from 19, 22, 25 x3, 26 and 27, plus 45. That is a very strange gap.

Anyway, at the time my guess was the odds of success were way below 80%. I had put them at zero, because the block was inevitable. Arkansas was not ready to win a game with a field goal.

It is this last point that should have determined the play calling.  A TD would be nice given score and time.  But the fact that the FG had at least a 1 in 5 chance of failing was a much bigger risk than trying one or two end zone (or even first down) throws.

Even if you want to run the football, don't fricking play for the field goal. All they did was try to slightly improve the distance and focus on the placement on the field, which was irrelevant, because we weren't going to make no darned field goal.

To sum all this up - I'm ok with the 4th down play because it was at least aggressive.  But if you are going to be aggressive once you have to be aggressive again.  Playing for a field goal was a mistake even if we would have made it.

Maybe Bielema was trying to make up for having taken too much risk by being what he thought was more risk averse. But it wasn't unless you care about window-dressing. From a window-dressing perspective, playing for the field goal was the "smart coach" thing to do. Given the odds of success, it was idiotic.

I know his (Smith's) scheme may be well thought out but spread teams are scoring TDs on around 80% of possessions (just made that number up) when we don't get a turnover.

Some passing stats...

Pat Mahomes 26-30 (87%) 243 yards - 1 TD, 2 INT - 9.3 ypc, 8.1 ypa
Kyle Allen 21-28 (75%) 358 yards - 2 TD, 0 INT - 17.0 ypc, 12.8 ypa
Chad Kelly 24-34 (71%) 368 yards - 3 TD, 0 INT - 15.3 ypc, 10.8 ypa
Dak Prescott 38-50 (76%) 508 yards - 5 TD, 1 INT - 13.4 ypc, 10.2 ypa

Here are those passers' per-game stats excluding the Arkansas game:

Pat Mahomes - 64% completion, 367 yards, 3 TD, 1 INT - 12.7 ypc, 8.2 ypa
Kyle Allen - 55% completion, 211 yards, 2 TD, 1 INT - 13.6 ypc, 7.4 ypa
Chad Kelly - 64% completion, 314 yards, 2 TD, 1 INT - 13.5 ypc, 8.7 ypa
Dak Prescott - 65% completion, 265 yards, 2 TD, 0 INT - 11.9 ypc, 7.7 ypa

These were all quite different football games. Common thread: Each QB completed a stupid-high percentage of passes against Arkansas's mostly zone pass "coverage." The three SEC opponents also managed very high per play and per completion yardage.

Another common thread was the absence of pressure on the opposing passer, with the defense spending a lot of time in no-man's land, or taking no risks in pass rush with seven players back attempting to play zone.

Essentially, Arkansas has chosen to allow very high completion % in an effort to not get beaten over the top. That strategy slowed down Texas Tech (which also scored on a trick play pass that Mahomes didn't throw) but was a flop in SEC games.

[cbhawg03]

You would be wrong. From that distance this year we have been 5 of 6 (83.3%). No need for anyone to attempt to be "kind" when it is a fact.

Put it this way, did you feel comfortable kicking the field goal?  Have you felt comfortable kicking a field goal the entire year?  Nobody has felt comfortable with our kicking game the entire year.  You only have a short and a deep kicker when you don't have a kicker.  Name one team that has a legitimate field goal kicker that uses a kicker for short kicks and long kicks.  I know its not the kicker's fault that it got blocked, but nobody felt comfortable with three halfback dives to bring out the kicker.

[Biggus Piggus]

Again you don't understand statistics OR how they are used to project  things. The only "fact" is the 5 for 6 number. That ABSOLUTELYA DOES NOT mean that the likelihood he makes that kick is 83%. The actual likelihood or projection is based on that one fact PLUS all other factors including situation.

For instance - with your reasoning if he was kicking in a hurricane the projection would be 83%. The actual likelihood would be much lower. This is a FACT. And it isn't being twisted. (Maybe just a little)

The actual fact is that Hedlund had made 1-4 field goals when kicking from a distance longer than 27 yards (or 3-6 from beyond 25). If you want to claim that the 27-yarder means he should have a great chance of making a 29-yarder, well, that's just guessing.

Hedlund had made field goals from

19, 22, 25 x3, 26, 27 and 45

His previous misses:

22, 37, 41, 47

Hedlund had shown the ability to miss a 22-yard field goal. He had shown the ability to make a 45-yarder.

He had never attempted one of around 30 yards in a college game.

I saw some NFL stats once on field goal accuracy. The probability of making a field goal fell about 10% or a little more when the line of scrimmage moved from the 10 to the 20. Fell another 6% moving to the 25, then another 9-10% moving to the 30. It's an exponential-looking function until you reach the 40, where few are attempted.

Anyway, even pro kickers don't make 85% from the 20-yard line (37 yards).

It says a lot that Hedlund had attempted eight field goals where the line of scrimmage was no farther than the 10-yard line. Compare that with four attempts outside the 10. Outside the 10, he had been 1-4.

Under perfect conditions with no defense, Hedlund's odds of making a 29-yard field goal might have been high. They were not good conditions at all, and the defense had a high probability of blocking the kick based on what I saw the whole game long.